“What I have learned since I’ve lived here; Mrs. Smolsky’s potato sacks are able to make you believe that she lives on the fifteenth floor… of a four story building.”

“The reason I said earlier that the mind is neither the Cartesian, highly intellectualized, cranium-confined firm-and-frozen ego, nor the self-effaced, world-immersed, flowing, field-like non-thingy occurrence, is that even though I was feeling my limbs to be alien to myself, that did not mean that I felt them to be disconnected. Rather, they were intimately connected, yet, merely connected to me, and not phenomenologically proper parts of myself. The mind-world boundary seems to have moved from the skin/environment junction to the innervated/denervated junction within the body. So part of the body has become external to the mind, or ‘de-minded’.”

“(...) to think that worms and slugs are neurologically simple is another blunder of contemporary, scientifically uninformed philosophy. To take as an example the current “superstar” nematode worm --superstar, because it was the first multicellular organism to have its genome completely sequenced, by 1998, and is widely used as a model organism-- the 1 mm long Caenorhabditis elegans, it exhibits a nervous system of 302 neurons and a sensorimotor system with very complex connectivity patterns.”

“Sajnos, én sohasem követtem el hibákat; életem téli álom volt, mert féltem a hidegtől.”

“Self-consciousness is, from a naturalistic point of view (in this case neurobiological), not more than a degree of sophistication of neural processes. The emergence of self-conscious states is not a drastic, extravagant, earth-shaking phenomenon.”

“In truth, there is no such thing as an “intuitive boundary” of a sensory state. That most philosophers take such states as brain-bound is not an intuition, but a prejudice.”

“Du sagtest, dein wirkliches Wesen würde niemand ertragen, du müßtest dich ständig transponieren, um einen Platz in der menschlichen Welt zu finden.”