“If D1 was a just distribution, and people voluntarily moved from it to D2, transferring parts of their shares they were given under D1 (what was it for if not to do something with?), isn't D2 also just? If the people were entitled to dispose of the resources to which they were entitled (under D1), didn't this include their being entitled to give it to, or exchange it with, Wilt Chamberlain? Can anyone else complain on grounds of justice? Each other person already has his legitimate share under D1. Under D1, there is nothing that anyone has that anyone else has a claim of justice against. After someone transfers something to Wilt Chamberlain, third parties still have their legitimate shares; their shares are not changed. By what process could such a transfer among two persons give rise to a legitimate claim of distributive justice on a portion of what was transferred, by a third party who had no claim of justice on any holding of the others before the transfer?”
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Analysis of Nozick's Argument on Justice and Voluntary Exchange
In this quote, philosopher Robert Nozick presents a thought-provoking argument regarding the principles of distributive justice, particularly in the context of voluntary exchanges between individuals. He challenges the idea that a just distribution must remain static and illustrates how freedom of choice plays a crucial role in determining justice.
Nozick begins by asserting that if Distribution 1 (D1) is just, and individuals voluntarily choose to move to Distribution 2 (D2)—even if it involves transferring shares or resources that they were entitled to under D1—then D2 can also be considered just. This highlights a key premise in Nozick's philosophy: justice is not solely about the initial distribution of resources but also about the actions individuals can take with those resources afterward.
The crux of his argument lies in the notion of entitlement. Individuals have the right to dispose of their shares as they see fit, which includes the ability to give or exchange resources. In his example, the transfer of resources to Wilt Chamberlain is used to illustrate this point. Since the initial shares remain intact and unchanged for others (third parties), he questions how anyone could justifiably claim a portion of what was transferred, given that they had no prior claim on those resources.
Nozick further emphasizes that, under the original distribution (D1), every individual has their legitimate share, and as such, no one can complain about justice when one person voluntarily exchanges part of their share with another. This perspective challenges more egalitarian views of justice, suggesting that as long as people operate within the bounds of consent and voluntary exchange, subsequent distributions can still be just, regardless of the resulting inequalities.
In conclusion, Nozick's argument underscores the importance of voluntary action in discussions about justice and distribution, ultimately advocating for a model of justice that accommodates personal choice and the dynamic nature of property rights.
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